In Moscow, Yerevan's steps are viewed as an attempt to push Russia out of the transport corridor that is being formed from Asia to Europe, which should pass through the South Caucasus bypassing Russian territory. Against this background, Armenia's intention to review the railway system management contract acquires not only economic, but also geopolitical significance. This is mentioned in the analytical article of "RIA Novosti". Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has stated that the government has all the legal tools to unilaterally dissolve the concession agreement signed with Russia. According to him, removing the subsidiary of "Russian Railways", "South Caucasian Railway" (SCR), from infrastructure management will be a political decision, for which Yerevan is preparing appropriate legal justifications. The Russian side considers this step in the scope of general review of Armenian-Russian cooperation. Earlier, Pashinyan left the issue of the withdrawal of the 102nd military base in Gyumri to Moscow's discretion, and before that, Yerevan was talking about freezing Armenia's membership in the CSTO, declaring that membership in the structure entails risks for the Armenians. There are for statehood. The concession agreement between the Government of Armenia and "Russian Railways" was signed in 2008 for a period of 30 years (with the possibility of extension for another 10 years). Based on that, the SCR received the right to manage railway transportation within the republic and to Georgia. The debts accumulated before the transfer remained on the Armenian side, and the Russian side paid Armenia 1.7 billion drams (less than 9 million dollars at that time). As mentioned in the article, at the time of signing the contract, the railway infrastructure of Armenia was in an extremely poor state, and there were no other contenders for management. Along with the railway, a number of related objects were also transferred to the Russian side. In the course of its activity, SCR repaired the lines, stations and power supply network, updated the rolling stock, as well as launched the Yerevan-Gyumri modern electric trains. At the same time, a number of projects, including the construction of the Vanadzor-Fioletovo section and the provision of a railway connection with the "Zvartnots" airport, remained on paper. The author of the article notes that their economic expediency raised questions due to the small turnover and high risks of losses. There have been disagreements about SCR in the past. In 2019, the Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation Vladimir Tokarev announced that the actions of the Armenian side hinder the normal work of the company. According to him, 10-year documents were seized, the management was threatened with criminal prosecution, and Yerevan refused to guarantee the observance of the contract. Today, however, the railway dispute is unfolding against the background of the formation of new transport routes that will change the entire logistics of the South Caucasus. In August 2025, Armenia and the USA signed the draft agreement related to the "Crossroads of Peace" project. It envisages the restoration of communication between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, as well as the expansion of the transport network between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia, with the opening of new border checkpoints and the restoration of railway sections. These programs fit into the logic of the Trans-Caspian international transport route, the purpose of which is to deliver Chinese goods to Europe by bypassing Russia. The European Union supports the creation of alternative routes, and Washington is interested in the development of transport and energy infrastructures in the South Caucasus. According to the analyst of "RIA Novosti", under the existing conditions, the possible termination of the contract with "Russian Railways" is not a change of an ordinary operator. This may become one of the steps to reorient the regional infrastructure to routes bypassing Russia. In Moscow, according to that analysis, Yerevan's steps can be perceived as part of the general policy of limiting Russian participation in Asia-Europe transport links. Therefore, the key question is not only the future of the Russian concession, but also what place Russia will occupy in the new transport architecture of the South Caucasus. If the development of the alternative corridor is accompanied by the expulsion of Russian companies from the regional infrastructure, Moscow has the risk of being on the sidelines of this prospective route of international cargo transportation.